GOVERNME.NT LOAN PROGRAMS ANI) PORTFOLIO CHOICE
There are two major mechanisms by which the government provides credit to private individuals through capital markets: guaranteed loans and direct loans.
3 In the former, the government, having designated the potential recipients, guarantees loans made to this group by private financial intermediaries (hereafter referred to as banks) against any default. In a competitive banking environment, banks will pass on the economic value of the guarantee to the borrower. As a result, the borrower obtains the loan at a lower rate than the hank would have charged without the government guarantee. 4
In the case ofdirect loans, a government agency acts as an intermediary in place of banks; it issues loans directly to the targeted group, obtaining the necessary i'his does not exhaust the forms of government capital market intervention, Other programs affecting capital nsarkets that have come under the scrutiny of the Treasury its receost years include lending by government-sponsored enterprises and tax exemptions for interest income on some types of loans. These are not cotssidcrcd in this paper. 5 This subsidy need not he restricted to tlse actuarially isir value of the insurance. The government also could charge the banks afee for the provision ofthe insurance Or could prox'ide a cash subsidy in addition to tlse guarantee if. fbr some reason. it wished the efl'ective subsidy rate to he clilkrent froas the expected defitult rate, Subtota. on-budget agencies 9 10? 100.220 funds from the capital markets by issuing Treasury securities. Because government securities are used to raise the funds, the interest cost will be lower than on funds raised by private institutions. If the government intermediary passes on this reduction, the borrower will obtain a subsidized rate of interest on his loan. 5
Oft-Budget Federal Entities
'The ssihsidy here refei's to tlse difference between tlse rate of intei'cst a horrower would pa\' if tise luass were nhtained frons a hank and the sate he would pay under either tIme loan guarantee Or direct hsan prngra~ss s of the governsn emit, Tim is ma\ not correspond to the subsidy as viewed by tIme taxpayer; tlsat is, the eQst of tIme loan less the i'atc of iisterest pm ci on time bass, Rot gls estimates of the i hsidies invol s'ed in thc' various government loan assd guarantec' programs are pi'esented iss Special Analysis F, Federal Credit Programs, 1982. See, especially, tables F'-11 A and F-ilB. Tables 1 and 2 present the various direct loan and guarantee programs that existed in the 1982 fiscal year. As the tables show, virtually every sector of the economy is covered by some type of program, and assistance to some sectors takes the form of both direct loans and guaranteed loans. For instance, of the $9,943 million loans and guarantees outstanding in 1982 for the Farmers Home Administration's program for rural development, $153 million was on-budget direct loans, $3,387 million was ofihudget direct loans through the Federal Finance Bank (FFB) and $6,403 million was provided through govermnent guarantees. Indeed, the FFB holdings of loans guaranteed by a variety of on-and off-budget agencies provides an especially convenient mechanism to convert loan guarantees into direct loans. '[lie FFB simply pur- Table   chases the guaranteed loans that would otherwise have Gov 'rnmcnt loans and guarantees embrace a variety been sold to private banks. 6 of programs none of which is of specific interest here. Thus, the subsequent analysis assumes that recipients t lt also should h noted that the distinction hctssei n on budget and off budget direct loans is ri_ails onl~in accounting distineon budget drect loans the funds 'ire aiboeated by the Tre i rs tion. 'set new drc et loans i sued h, on budget agencies are treated directly to the sg ncs in the cas nf FFB direct lc'nding the F 113 as part of the budget. an increase of Si million in these loans hows draw on its line of credit at th' lreasurs amid the Trea ury then up as an incr is' of 3i million ia the hudget dc fleit. An increase of issu 's debt to pro' id' the F F B with the funds This accountin,, the same amount in off budget FF13 direct loan. wouldsot sncrc'msc convention while pet haps important for congrcs ional control has the deficit. Both will do precmseis the same thing to the goserument no op~rationii meaning for the ssne consid red here and debt however namel~increase it hi, Si mullion. In the else of ignored.
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of government direct loans or guarantees are drawn randomly from the general population. Our focus is on the effect of moving a preselected group of individuals from one type of program to the other, without regard to the specific program itself.'
The principal difference between the government direct loan and guarantee programs lies in the portfolios that households and banks must hold as a result of these programs. For a given level of total government credit provided, an increase in the number of direct loans granted will increase the amount of government securities that must be held by either banks or households. Therefore, a general model of portfolio choice is necessary to trace the effects of differential changes in the two programs. In this article, the analysis is derived from the implications of a formal model based on the work of James Tobin and detailed elsewhere.
8
To present the model, the credit market is first described for the case in which no government credit programs exist; then the innpacts of introducing first a guarantee program and then a direct loan program are examined. Having examined the impact of each program separately, the differential impact of the two programs on interest rates and aggregate demand can then be assessed.
THE MARKET FOR THE STOCK OF CREDIT
Suppose there are no government direct loan or guarantee programs. The market for credit then is characterized in figure 1. D 0 describes the demand for loans by the private sector and is a function not only of the loan rate, R 9
, hut also of rates of return on capital goods arid on government securities, An increase in the loan rate decreases the quantity of credit de-7 The choice of program amid recipient is, however, important in considering the impact of increases in total federal credit assistance. The answer to the question of whether such increases would increase the welfare of society hinges on whether the new assistance decreased differences us the social amid private marginal benefits ofcredit to the recipient. The assumption that recipients are chosen randomly would he inappropriate for such an analysis. Therefore, this question is not addressed in this arlicle. The Loan Market, Excluding Government Loan Programs
Loan rate of interest
The credit supply curve ofbanks is described by the upward sloping line 5 o~By assumption, it is positively sloped to reflect the increasing marginal costs of lending. These costs consist of the operating costs of the bank loan department and the cost of obtaining funds to lend, either by attracting more deposits or by selling government securities from the bank's portfolio' 0 An increase in the rate ofreturn on any other asset that the bank could hold would shift the supply curve for credit up, as would an increase in the rate of interest on deposits. As drawn in figure 1, the equilibrium level of credit is L 0 and the equilibrium rate of interest on it is 11,0.°I nprinciple, at least, increases in the rate ofreturn on any asset will increase the demand for credit as the household reshuffles its entire porffolio to take advantage ofthis higher return, In practice, it cast he expected that increases in R, will alter credit demand more thasm would an equal increase is) 11. or R,m. l'his is because households generally do not borrow to purchase assets that yield pecuniary' returns lower than the loan rate.
tm0 rhe analysis in Fried, Government Direct Loans (see equation i-3) supposes that government securities, like 'nones', can he viewed as a" producer's good" that facilitates exchange activity.
See also Joel Fried and Peter Howitt, ''The Effects of Inflation On
Real Interest Rates," American Economic Review (December 1983). pp. , for a more detailed presentatiosm of this view.
manded; increases in rates of return on other assets shift the demand curve out.°2
introducing a Government-Guaranteed Loan Program
Now suppose the government institutes a government guarantee program that is available only to a portion of the population.
1 ' Figure 2 shows the consequences of this program in the credit market. For comparison, D 0 and S~are the same as in figure 1 . D, describes the demand for loanable funds by all potential borrowers who are not eligible for governmentguaranteed loans.
To establish the effects of the guarantee program, some assumptions about the relationship between the rate ofinterest on loans that do not have a government guarantee, 11,, and on those that do have the guarantee, R~, must be made. We shall assume that the government wants to provide preferred borrowers a fixed subsidy rate, 5, per dollar of loan, and that the banking system is sufficiently competitive that, at the margin, the profit rates on guaranteed and nonguaranteed loans are equalized.' 2 Thus, 
R
Under this assumption, changes in S cause the total demand for credit, as a function of R~,to shift; as S is increased, individuals eligible for government-guaranteed loans would increase their demand for credit at any given H,. Thus, for a positive subsidy rate, credit demand would be greater than it otherwise would be without the guarantee program. D 2 in figure 2 de-"As mentioned eadier, it is supposed that those eligible for the government programs are chosen randomly from the population at large. This assumption is not meant to deny one rationale often given for government credit assistance programs, namely, that these are set up to provide funds to high-risk individuals and institutions. Rather, it is to clarift the exposition ofthe financing effects of the direct loan and guarantee programs, which is our primary concern, If this assumption is not made, then the loan supply schedule ofbanks would depend on how the favored group was chosen, If the government could identify the high-risk borrowers in the economy and provide them with guarantees or direct loans, then the snmpply cun'e ofloans by banks to uninsured borrowers. ceteris paribus, would most likely shift omst with the establishment of the government programs.
' 2 Suppose hanks initially' did not pass on these reduced costs to the borrower. Then, D, svould continue to describe the total demand for credit. Each hank, however, would have an incentive to ofier a lower rate to insured borrowers or give loans to thesn in preferestee to uninsured borrowers, Over tune, therefore, H,, would be forced down relative to R 9 . l'he competitive banking industrs' assumption says simply that, in equilihrium, relative rates are such that any imsdividual hank will he indifibrent to offering the next loan to either an insured or an ssninsured horrosver.
scribes this new demand curve for total credit with the introduction of the government guarantee program. At R,~,there is now an excess demand for loans of the amount L 2 L 0 . This puts pressure on 11, to rise. Furthermore, as banks issue more loans, they will sell government securities. Therefore, the rate of interest on these securities, 11 g' increases. The increase in Hg causes the credit supply curve to shift up, so that less credit will be supplied at any given 11,. Finally, as individuals take out additional loans, they increase their demand for titles to capital goods, causing the rate of return on these assets, 11 k' to fall. This reduces, in part, the demand for loans, but does not shift the demand schedule hack to D 0
.' 3
The new portfolio equilibrium will be at some new loan rate, H,,, greater than 1190, and will be characterized by a higher K, and lower 11 k~Furthermore, if the credit market is stable, the equilibrium rate of interest on guaranteed loans, H, -5, will be less thañ it is also the case that, from general portfolio considerations, the demand for credit will shift out as R, rises. For mtotational convenience, these demand curve shifts have heemi suppressed in figure 2.
r1
H,~. At this new set of interest rates, there will be a total supply ofcredit of the amount L 4 , consisting of L 3 non-guaranteed loans and L 4 -L 3 governmentguaranteed loans. Loans to borrowers ineligible for government-guaranteed loans of the amount L 3 -that would have been made at H,~are no longer made.
The portfolio readjustment described above represents the initial response to the introduction of the government guarantee program. Because relative yields on financial instruments have been altered, the stocks that households wish to hold will change. This, in turn, will alter the allocation of flows over time. In particular, because the demand price for capital has increased (11k has fallen), there is an increase in the demand for real capital, stimulating the production of these goods and increasing aggregate demand in general.' 5
The increase in aggregate demand can take the form of an increase in prices or real income. Suppose that real income begins to increase first, transiently rising above full-employment output. This increase generates increased savings to provide the real resources to accommodate the real investment. Overtime, however, the demands on real resources begin to be reflected in increased prices. These increases reduce real cash balances and real holdings of government securities by more than they otherwise would have been. In an attempt to maintain the real holdings of these assets, banks would decrease their supplies of credit, forcing loan rates up. The long-run equilibrium would then be characterized by a decline to full-employment real income, a higher price level and lower real supplies of monetary base and government interest-bearing debt. The distribution of loans hero see this, note that the initial shock was an increase in loans supplied at any givenR 9 . would be such that recipients of governmentguaranteed loans would have a greater command over resources at the expense of borrowers ineligible for guarantees and the population at large who pays for the subsidies in the program.
introducing a Government Direct Loan P.rogram
Now consider the consequences if the government initiates a direct loan program instead of a loan guarantee program. To facilitate the comparison, suppose the government again provides the same subsidy rate per dollar of loan, 5, so that the interest rate on government direct loans, H,,~,is (2) R,,~= .H~-S. Further, suppose the same individuals are eligible for the govermnent direct loans as were eligible for the loan guarantees. As figure 3 shows, under these assumptions, D 0 , D, and D 2 are the same as in figure 2 except that the horizontal distance between D, and D 2 now describes the demand for government direct loans instead of guaranteed loans. H,~and L 0 describe the bank loan rate and volume of credit before the introduction of the direct loan program.
To examine the forces at work when the direct loan program is introduced, consider the demand and supply of credit at H, 0 . First, there will be an excess supply of loans that the banks wish to issue of the amount -L,. This is because those customers who had taken out bank loans before, now find that their eligibility for direct government loans reduces their cost of credit. Consequently, they no longer demand hank loans at H,~.At 1190, however, banks would not want to alter their planned supply of credit; the decreased demand and unchanged supply mean an excess supply. Second, at 11~ot he total demand for credit has increased to L 2 from L 0 . To finance this demand for government direct loans, the government will issue government securities. Thus, there is also an excess supply of government securities. This causes H,to rise, shifting up the credit supply function of banks to, say, While~2 is drawn such that 119 rises in the new portfolio equilibrium, this need not he the case. At an increase in K 4 increases the opportunity cost of bank loans. This may or may not offset the cost decreases that accompany the reduction of the scale of bank loan operations to L, from L 0 : if it does offset these cost decreases, then 119 will rise; if it does not, H, will fall.
The impact on aggregate desnand is qualitatively the same as occurs with an increase in guaranteed loans. There is an increase in the demand price of capital (a decrease in 11k), making it more profitable for firms to invest. This puts pressure on output and prices to increase. The increase in price, in turn, reduces real wealth, causing output to fall to its full-employment level. This causes loan rates to rise and the demand price of capital to fall. The real quantity of monetary base will be less than it was at the initial equilibrium.
A Gompensated Ghanze in Government-Guaranteed and Direct Loans
Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 describe the portfolio effects of both the gimaranteed loan and direct loan programs. With the exception of the loan rate on uninsured bank loans, these results are identical. The question now to he addressed is: What are the consequences on interest rates and aggregate demand if the direct loan program is expanded and the guarantee program reduced, so that there is no change in the total ntimber of individuals eligible for the governsnent subsidized rate of interest? In other words, does it matter whether a direct loan program is used instead ofa loan To answer this question, suppose the government currently has both programs in operation. Further, suppose that the interest rate on direct government loans is equal to the net of subsidy rate, H, -5, on government-guaranteed loans. Thus, grani, the total demand br hospital care will imicrease. If hemie' flciaries of the programn mnay use any private hospital, the cost of hospital care at these institutions will rise, crowdimig out some unimssurcd individuals, though not as mnany as the incm'eased number of insssred patients (or costs svould not Isave increased). II. on the other hand, insured patients can receive ssshsidized care omily if they go to certain specified government hospitals, as required say, by the Veterans Administration programs, demand at minn-\'A hospitals 'vill fall, causing hospital costs there either to decrease (because ofthe lower utili-zation) or increase (because the rlemnamsd for doctors will have increased causing their salaries to rise at all hospitals). The Medicare program is simnilar to the loan gmmarantee programn. TheVA program is analogous to the dim'ect loan prngrasn Costs to the patients are analogous to the loan rates to borm'owers wishing to pmsrchase capital and the price of doctors' sem'vices is an anah g to the interest rate ob govermmment securities. ment-guaranteed and non-guaranteed), and D is the total demand for credit nnder the pricing assnmption made above. The initial equilibrium is at H 0 , with L non-guaranteed loans, L -L government-guaranteed loans, and L -L; direct government loans. Now suppose that the government changes its policies so that some individuals lose their eligibility for government-guaranteed loans, but are now eligible for government direct loans. This is described in figure 4 by a shift in the demand for total bank credit from D to Dc. Suppose initially that the loan rate remained at
and Hg remained at its initial level. There would then be an excess supply of total bank loans of the amount L-L 4 and, because government direct loans are financed by issuing government securities, an excess supply of government secnrities of an eqnal amount. The former puts pressure on H, to fall and the latter causes government security rates to rise until a new portfolio equilibrium is established. If the system is stable, then H; will fall, say, to R,, and Hg will rise above its initial rate.
1 ' Because the total supply of "An implication of this analysis is that an increase in the federal budget need not, ceteris paribus, cause loan rates to rise nor crowd out borrowing and investment by the private sector. This is credit has increased, there will be an increase in the demand price for capital and in the level of aggregate demand 18 Therefore, the analysis suggests that the use of government direct loans increases aggregate demand more than government guaranteed loans that provided credit to the same individuals at the same rate of interest.
As a consequence of the increase in aggregate demand, either quantities or prices must rise to equilibrate the goods market. If prices rise, interest rates on loans and on titles to capital tend to rise as demands for these instruments decline with the decrease in real wealth. Because both investors and consumers face decreases in wealth from the price rise, these groups will reduce their (real) planned expenditures. It further seems reasonable to suppose that personal consumption will decrease, so that borrowers obtain an increased command over the flow of real resources. Thus, even with the price adjustment, the demand price ofcapital is greater than it was before the change in the program.
S I] vIMABY
This article has argued that government direct loan programs are more stimulative than government guarantee programs with identical amounts of credit assistance. 19 The use of the direct loan program will because direct loans by on-budget agencies are included in the budget deficit. Such direct loans could increase through a compensated decrease in government-guaranteed loans, in which ease the analysis implies that private loan rates would fall. Even ass uneompensated increase in direct loans by on-budget agencies may cause an initial decrease in loan rates (see Fried, Governnwnt Direct Loans) . ' 5 1n figure 4, the fall in Itwill, for a given 5, lower R.ãnd H and therefore increase the demand for direct and guaranteed loans.
This explains only part of the increased demand. The same qualitative results also hold when the total subsidy (L -L~)S,remains fixed. (The ease of the fixed total subsidy is derived in Fried, Government Direct Loans.) The rise in E~causes individuals and banks to conserve (Sn their cash balances and excess reserves. This permits a total expansion of credit as the yield on deposits is increased, increasing total bank deposits. The sufficient conditions for a compensated increase in government direct loans to be expansionary are that the demand for capital goods be more responsive toloan rates than to government security yields, and that the demand for the monetary base and deposits be more responsive to government security rates than to loan rates.
' 9 Critical to this result are the assumptions that government securities and guaranteed loans are not perfect substitutes for one another in bank portfolios, that guaranteed loans are closer substitutes to non-guaranteed loans than are government securities, that the demand for capital is more responsive to loan rates than to government security rates and that demand for the monetary base responds more to government security rates than to loan rates.
generate lower loan rates to borrowers not receiving government assistance, higher interest rates on government securities and a higher demand price for capital.
These results can be seen intuitively by supposing that, in increasing direct loans, the government arbitrarily exchanges $1 million of government securities for $1 million of previously issued, governmentguaranteed loans in bank portfolios. Banks then find themselves with an excess supply of government securities and too few loans in their portfolios, which puts pressure on government security rates to rise and loan rates to uninsured borrowers to fall. The lower loan rates provide an incentive to households to purchase more capital and other commodities with borrowed funds so that either aggregate demand or the demand price of capital increases, or both.
Additional implications are that government budget deficits as currently measured may not accurately reflect the government's impact on the credit market and private capital expenditures; also, because government credit programs can change relative interest rates, any specific interest rate may be misleading as an indicator of financial market conditions.
